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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper analyses the price developments between the European Energy 
Exchange EEX and OTC wholesale spot markets in Germany using a linear state 
space model based on Kalman filter analysis. Our results suggest increasingly 
integrated German wholesale spot markets for electricity. The results remain the 
same when correcting for the influence of the introduction of the emissions 
allowance trading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 The creation of organized wholesale energy exchange markets as a response to 
the European Directive (98/30/EC) has been an important breakthrough in the 
European energy market liberalization process. The Directive aimed at opening the 
electricity and natural gas markets across the European states to competition so that 
consumers would eventually benefit from a secure supply of energy for the least 
possible price. As a consequence, Germany deregulated its energy markets with the 
introduction of the German energy Act on 29 April 1998. Subsequently, two 
wholesale exchange spot markets, Leipzig Power Exchange (LPX) and European 
Energy Exchange (EEX, located in Frankfurt) started operation in the summer of 
2000. The two power exchanges merged on 1 January 2002 into the present day 
European Energy Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig.1 Previously, wholesale electricity spot 
trading in Germany had been organized bilaterally in the over-the-counter (OTC) 
market usually via telephone and facsimile and was therefore rather non-transparent. 
However, the changing nature of traded volumes at the wholesale electricity markets 
with a continuous increase in power exchange trading suggests that both the spot 
markets (OTC and energy exchange) have become an integral aspect of wholesale 
electricity trading in Germany today.  
 When speaking of volumes, the wholesale electricity trading has changed across 
the OTC and the EEX since the EEX spot market at Leipzig came into operation. 
In 2004, around 10 to 12 percent of the total underlying physical capacity was 
traded on the EEX spot market. Total turnover in the forward and future market 
was around 1500-1800 TWh, combining both OTC and the power exchange trading 
then. In 2005, around 347 TWh of the wholesale electricity trading was traded via 
power exchange while the remaining 90% (3123 TWh) was traded in the OTC 
market. As of 2007, the OTC market covered 1900 TWh of the total wholesale 
electricity trade. Meanwhile, the EEX also registered a trading volume of 1044 TWh 
in 2006 with a 200% increment from 2005. Hence, bilateral wholesale trading in the 
OTC market still dominates the German electricity wholesale market. But the 
development of the EEX power exchange has meant that the total bilateral trade is 
decreasing while the organized trade is rising.  
 The reverse pattern volumes development across both spot markets suggests that 
the EEX and OTC spot market are close substitutes to each other. In other words, 
with EEX in place, the wholesale market participants have an additional option of 
trading in two competing spot markets. This should result in the wholesale spot 
markets becoming increasingly competitive. On the other hand, the opaque 
characteristics of the still important OTC spot trading can hinder the development 
of competitive wholesale spot markets. This is because a non-transparent market 
can lead to the actual or potential abuse of market power. Also, the price formed in 
a non-transparent market may not actually depict the real economic conditions. In 
contrary, the power exchange spot price is an important reference price for OTC 
trading and thereby mitigates the disadvantage of a limited price transparency, low 
                                                 
1 From September 2009, the EEX spot market merged with the French Powernext to EPEX Spot 
SE.  
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levels of liquidity2 and significant transaction costs involved under the OTC trading 
mechanism. Understanding the economic interaction between the EEX and OTC is 
a prerequisite for successful wholesale market development on a way to an 
integrated national market. Therefore this issue becomes increasingly important 
from both an economic and a policymaking perspective. 
 However depending upon the maturity of the wholesale markets, the economic 
interactions between these spot markets may not remain constant over time. 
Furthermore, the nature of price interactions may change with changing market 
developments and reforms in the wholesale market.  
 This paper studies the economic interactions over time between the spot market 
prices at the power exchange and the OTC market as a result of structural changes, 
new market designs and regulations. We therefore empirically examine if these spot 
market prices converge over time. Our results allow an evaluation on the success of 
wholesale market reforms and, by that, offer relevant policy conclusions. 
 Previous empirical research consists of two strands of literature that focus on 
either European electricity market integration or wholesale price formation in 
Germany. A study by Bower (2002) applied co-integration and co-relation 
techniques to the daily wholesale prices at various power exchanges in Europe 
concluding that some evidence of market integration was already in place in 2001. 
Similarly, Boisseleau (2004) focused on a regression and co-relation analysis to find 
that the level of integration of European markets was very low in 2002. Zachmann 
(2008) and Armstrong and Galli (2005) studied the European price developments 
over time. Using a Kalman filter analysis to study the price developments at the 
major European power exchanges, the former provided evidence of price 
convergence of Germany wholesale prices with the Dutch and Danish prices. The 
latter looked at the development of price differentials over time. With the results 
obtained from price differences, they conclude that prices across major power 
exchanges in Europe may be converging. Within the German context, a recent study 
by Growitsch and Nepal (2009) showed the long term evidence of co-integration 
between the spot prices on the EEX and OTC markets. However their study does 
not explain the development and convergence of the spot prices across the two 
markets over time.  
 A second strand of literature examined the level of competition on the German 
electricity market by means of market power analysis. Müsgens (2006) analysed the 
wholesale market prices in relation to the marginal cost finding evidence that 
strategic firm behaviour pushed the wholesale electricity prices from 2001 to 2003. 
On the contrary, Schwarz and Lang (2006) concluded that increasing fuel prices and 
2005 emission allowance prices primarily led to an increase in the wholesale prices 
during the year 2004 and 2005. Weigt and Hirschhausen (2008) developed a 
competitive benchmark model to conclude that wholesale electricity prices at EEX 
were significantly above the competitive levels during most of the period of 2004 
and 2006. On the other hand, Kemfert and Treber (2007) concluded that the 
German electricity market attained full competition by applying a strategic model to 
analyse market power and climate policy. Zachmann and Hirschhausen (2008) 
                                                 
2 An important factor for low levels of liquidity in an OTC market could be due to a restricted 
number of potential market participants ex ante unlike in a power exchange where there are no 
restrictions on the number of potential market participants. 
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found first evidence of an asymmetric cost pass through of emission allowance 
prices by examining the wholesale electricity prices in Germany. They conclude that 
the exercise of market power and hence a non-competitive wholesale market could 
be the reason behind such an asymmetric pass-through.  
 Amidst these contradictory findings, it is particularly interesting that none of the 
previous studies have studied the relation and dynamics of spot prices at the power 
exchange and the OTC spot prices in Germany. Thus, this paper contributes to the 
research on German wholesale electricity prices by assessing und understanding the 
price development in the wholesale market. Therefore, we empirically analyse the 
price formation over time across the two spots markets EEX and OTC, using the 
Kalman filter analysis (Kalman, 1960). Studying the path of price convergence 
across markets while accounting for dynamics of price developments enables us to 
identify market integration in the German electricity spot market as a process rather 
than a state. Our results give important insights about previous success and future 
energy market reform policy. 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section one discusses the fundamental 
wholesale market developments in Germany after the EEX at Leipzig started its 
operation since 2002. Section two describes the data used along with the descriptive 
statistics. The econometric methodology applied in this study is discussed under 
section three. The estimation results and discussions are elaborately carried out in 
section four, followed by the conclusions. 
 
1. WHOLESALE MARKET DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY 
 
 The German wholesale power market went through significant reforms and 
changes since its liberalisation in 1998. In 2000, two power exchanges started 
operations which have been merged to EEX in 2002. The electricity tax faced a rise 
in 2003.  
 In 2005, the trading rights for the emission of greenhouse gases were introduced 
within the EU as compliance towards the Kyoto Protocol. Since then, EEX 
provided a platform to trade the spot contracts for EU emissions allowance in the 
wholesale market. Since September 2006, the EEX also started operating an intra-
day market increasing the overall volumes of trade in the wholesale market. 
 Notably as of 2009, the German transmission system operators (TSO’s) are 
obliged to sell the entire portion of electricity generated from renewable sources on 
the spot market at EEX. This mandatory trading of renewable sources strengthens 
the importance of EEX spot markets against the OTC markets. 
 Similarly, the structure of the German electricity industry itself has undergone 
several changes since the deregulation started in 1998. Prior to deregulation, the 
power industry in Germany was traditionally organised in vertically integrated 
companies responsible for generation, transmission and distribution of electricity. 
Each company had a geographic monopoly and was obliged to deliver electricity 
within its region of operations. The liberalization of the electricity sector changed 
this into a competitive market where each consumer now could buy power from any 
electricity supply company within Germany (so-called market opening). As of 2005, 
around 200 new suppliers (other than renewable) had entered the German market 
since the deregulation in 1998. However the market opening also forced market 
players to engage in restructuring programs as 30 mergers (involving 80 companies) 
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and 100 co-operation ventures (including 500 companies) occurred, leading to a 
strong concentration process and profound structural change in the German 
electricity wholesale market. On the network regulation side, as of January 1st 2009, 
Germany switched to incentive regulation in the form of revenue caps from the 
traditionally practiced cost plus regulation. The regulatory regime in place can bear 
significant consequences for facilitating wholesale competition as the regulated 
transmission and distribution networks serve as platforms on which the competing 
wholesale and retail suppliers depend (Joskow, 2008). These changes in the form of 
market restructuring and new market rules might have affected the behaviour of the 
bilateral price as well as the power exchange wholesale electricity price in Germany.  
 
2. DATA 
 
 The aim of this paper is to study the price development in the German electricity 
wholesale spot markets along with the structural market changes since the 
establishment of the EEX spot market. Although trading on the exchange spot 
market takes place on an hourly level no such information exists concerning the 
OTC spot trading. For this purpose we use the day-ahead spot prices for wholesale 
electricity traded via EEX and bilaterally at the OTC market. The day-ahead 
electricity prices are the daily average prices. The price data for EEX is obtained 
from the EEX website while the data for the OTC day-ahead prices is obtained 
from Energate3. The day-ahead prices is preferred against the forwards and future 
prices because it reflects the recent market situation and also precludes many of the 
uncertainties prevalent on forwards and futures markets. Also, the temporal 
aggregation problems experienced with the using lower frequency data (such as 
monthly, yearly) is avoided using the day-ahead prices.  
 The time frame of our analysis dates from March 3, 2003, which is the year after 
the start of operations of EEX at Leipzig, till May 29, 2009. The prices have been 
have been logarithmized as the spot market prices for electricity tend to be highly 
volatile and may be potentially heteroscedastic in nature. Figure 1 illustrates the 
price data graphically. 
 It can be observed from Figure 1 that the power exchange and bilateral prices 
share a similar pattern of price movements over time. But it is noteworthy to 
mention that the prices exhibit an inter-diurnal pattern rather than an intra-diurnal 
pattern due to daily average spot prices being used in our analysis. The year 2006 
experienced the highest peak in the day-ahead spot prices as a result of increasing 
fuel and emissions allowance prices. Likewise a strong case of seasonal variation can 
be seen across both spot market prices. The descriptive statistics of the individual 
price series provide a picture on the statistical properties of the prices (Table 1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Energate records the OTC price data obtained from Spectron, a brokering firm for OTC contracts. 
It should be mentioned that Spectron OTC prices may or may not be truly representative of all 
the bilateral wholesale trading in Germany. The Spectron OTC German baseload power indices 
are calculated based on the volume-weighted average of all Day-ahead baseload transactions 
performed between 0800-1100 Central Eastern Time (CET) for delivery into the German 
transmission grids. 
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Figure 1: 
Logarithmic transformed day-ahead spot prices (€/MWh) 
 
 
Table 1: 
 Descriptive statistics for price series (€/MWh) 
 
Variables EEX OTC 
Mean 47.91 49.29 
Median 41.47 42.94 
Maximum 301.54 177.25 
Minimum 5.80 9.20 
Standard 
Deviation 
22.23 21.51 
Skewness 2.31 1.41 
Kurtosis 16.98 5.81 
Observation 1630 1556 
 
 A closer look at the standard deviations calculated from more than 1500 
observations for each price series shows that prices on both markets are similarly 
volatile. The maximum price at EEX is slightly higher, the minimum price a bit 
lower than OTC. Overall both price series share rather similar descriptive statistics 
while the marginal differences might be attributed to the transparent versus non-
transparent nature of trading settlement at the EEX and OTC market respectively. 
The next section describes the econometric methodology used in this study. 
 
1
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3. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
 The aim of this paper is to study the price development across the German 
wholesale spot markets along with structural changes over time. Given such changes 
(such as new market designs, change in fundamental market rules and regulations) 
the markets in consideration are likely to change the pattern of their integration - 
either markets move towards a greater level of integration or they tend to separate 
from each other. Hence the notion of market integration or separation can be 
analysed respectively by testing for the convergence or divergence of the prices of 
the considered markets.  
 A well established method to identify price convergence is co-integration 
analysis. However one implicit assumption of co-integration analysis is that the 
structural relation among the prices is fixed over the considered time period. As 
mentioned in several studies, including King and Cuc (1996), the co-integration 
relationship completely ignores the dynamics of any possible price convergence or 
divergence. Considering the dynamic structural developments in the German 
wholesale electricity market as discussed previously, the assumption of a fixed 
relationship between spot prices over time seems indeed problematic. 
 Therefore we use a linear state space representation to understand the price 
convergence under a dynamic system. The state space approach incorporates the 
state variables (unobserved variables) to be estimated along with the observable 
model. The state space model is analysed using Kalman filter analysis which is based 
on a recursive algorithm. With this approach, the nature and path of price 
convergence across markets can be studied, explaining market integration by 
estimating a time-variant coefficient model. Using the day-ahead spot prices at EEX 
and OTC market, the following equations can be formulated constituting a linear 
relationship between the two markets: 
 
                           Peex,t = αeexotc + βeexotc,t Potc,t  + εt   (1)4 
 
                           βeexotc, t = βeexotc,t-1 + θt       (2) 
 
 Equation (1) is termed as the ‘signal’ or ‘observation’ equation while equation (2) 
is known as the ‘state’ or transition equation. In the above set of equations, εt and θt 
are normally and independently distributed random error terms (with zero mean and 
a normal variance σ2) or white noise.   αeexotc captures the transaction cost between 
the EEX and OTC day-ahead spot markets while βeexotc describes the price 
relationship between the two markets considered: if the EEX and OTC spot 
markets are perfectly integrated the value of βeexotc,t  equals unity at any time t. This 
implies that the prices across both markets are fully converged and that any price 
differences between the two markets can be attributed to the transaction costs 
involved in trading. On the other hand, if βeexotc,t = 0, the prices of day-ahead 
electricity traded on both markets bear no relation with each other any time: 
 
                                                 
4 Alternatively the linear relationship of prices between the two markets can also be constituted such 
that the day-ahead spot prices at OTC market is a function of the spot price at the EEX:  
Potc, t = αeexotc, t + βeexotc, t Peex, t  + εt.    In either case, equation two holds true. 
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t implying perfectly uncorrelated prices. So the case of βeexotc,t = 1 is also a 
conformity towards the law of one price5.  
 If EEX and OTC day-ahead markets are fully integrated or the spot prices are in 
full convergence, the value of {lim t→infinity (Peex – Potc)} = αeexotc while the final state 
of convergence shall be {lim t→infinity βeexotc} = 1. The transactions costs of trading 
across the two markets are considered to be constant over time in our model. 
 Applying the time variant co-efficient model to the whole price sample (Peex and 
Potc) will enable us to identify the joint development of prices. It provides 
information on the value of state variables (αeexotc and βeexotc,t) for each point in time 
for both price series. Therefore the Kalman filter processes the data on both price 
series in two consecutive steps. It first estimates βeexotc,t by using available 
information till the period t-1. As a second step the estimates of βeexotc,t are updated 
by incorporating prediction errors from the first step as information at the time t is 
realized.  
 The time variant coefficient model produces linear minimum mean error 
estimates of βeexotc, t using observed and available data through time t. Thus, being 
based on a specific optimization recursive algorithm, it allows for the updating of 
the model estimations using newly available information (Hamilton, 1994). The 
filter approach ensures that the corrections made in βeexotc,t beyond t (say t+k) 
follow a time-varying moving average process of order k-1. The next section 
presents the results of our time variant co-efficient model with a detailed discussion. 
 
4. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
 As a pre-requisite to the empirical analysis it is necessary to analyse and examine 
some statistical properties of the data used in the estimations. Hence,we begin with 
the unit roots tests as a first step of our empirical analysis. To test for the presence 
of a unit root we apply the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 
1979). The results from ADF tests on the first difference of both price series 
suggest that the price series are stationary as the p-value is significant at the 1% level 
of significance. This implies that both the price series are integrated of order one or 
I(1).6 The absence of a unit root can be explained by the fact that electricity is not 
economically storable unlike other commodities and hence cannot be allocated 
between different periods in time.  
 Given the stationary price series as suggested by the ADF test, we study the 
economic interactions among the price series at the day ahead OTC and EEC spot 
markets by means of correlation analysis. Table 2 presents the results.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The law of one price can be interpreted such that in well integrated markets, any price differential 
between the markets should eventually converge towards the transaction costs. For the OTC 
market the transactions costs would be the search cost, information cost and bargaining costs 
involved in trading among different players. Concerning exchange trading transaction costs is the 
fee of participating in the EEX.   
6 The price series being I (1) also imply that they are co-integrated which can be interpreted as a pre-
test towards testing for price convergence using any co-integration tests. 
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Table 2:  
Correlation coefficients of the price series 
 
Variables EEX OTC 
EEX 1.000 0.938 
OTC 0.938 1.00 
 
 
 The table shows a high degree of co-relation between the two prices. This result 
implies a strong indication of interdependence between the spot markets. This 
strong interdependence indicates the prices are being driven by each other or by an 
exogenous third factor that simultaneously affects each price series separately. To 
analyse the further nature of interdependence in the price series not revealed by 
correlation analysis, a Granger causality test (Granger 1969) is used. Table 3 shows 
the results. 
Table 3:  
Granger Causality tests 
 
Pair-wise Granger Causality Tests 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis F- Statistic Probability (p-value) 
OTC does not Granger 
cause EEX 
82.07 0.000 
EEX does not Granger 
cause OTC 
46.43 0.000 
 
 
 The results from the Granger causality test suggest a bi-directional causality 
between the two spot markets. This might be interpreted as that a common market 
exists and that both EEX and OTC spot prices are driven by the same exogenous 
factors. In another words a bi-directional causality might be a sign of an integrated 
market. However the development and dynamics of market integration cannot be 
detected from a Granger causality test. Therefore we use a linear state space model 
for this purpose. 
 The time variant co-efficient estimations based on a recursive algorithm allow us 
to analyse the convergence/divergence path of the prices series over time allowing 
for various structural changes discussed in section two. With the use of the Kalman 
filter, the effect of these structural changes on the spot markets’ integration can be 
examined by observing the development of the βeexotc co-efficient over time. Figure 2 
demonstrates the time varying path of βeexotc for the day-ahead prices across the 
German EEX and the OTC market within the stipulated (+ 2 and -2) mean square 
errors. The final state value of the beta co-efficient being 0.99 suggests an integrated 
wholesale market. The state vector also seems considerably increasingly stable after 
2005, which was the year of the emissions tradings introduction.  
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Figure 2:  
Time varying path of the convergence coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 To specifically understand the market integration process through price 
convergence we also analyse the short run dynamics. Therefore, we apply a vector 
error correction model (VECM) in order to comprehend the long run convergence 
process via short term price adjustments given a certain policy shock. Table 4 
reports the error correction co-efficients obtained from our VECM estimates. The 
error correction co-efficients (or adjustment co-efficients) being significantly large, 
confirm the convergence process. After a certain policy shock, around 68% of 
downward price adjustment occurs in the overall wholesale market by changes in 
the EEX spot prices alone, while 30% of upwards price adjustment occurs by 
changes in the OTC spot prices from one period to the next. We explain the higher 
magnitude and speed of price adjustment in the exchange spot by the higher 
information transparency and liquidity allowing the exchange spot market to absorb 
and incorporate new available market information quickly into the prices. Thus 
information efficiency, which in this paper we define as the ability of the market to 
respond to new market signals, is at least twice as much in the exchange spot market 
than in the OTC spot market. Based on this result, the increasing volumes of trade 
in the exchange spot market in Germany is certainly promising in enhancing the 
overall informational efficiency of the wholesale market as a whole. 
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Table 4:  
VEC estimates 
 
Error Correction: d(EEX) (in logs) d(OTC) (in logs) 
Co-integration 
Equation 
-0.6793 
(0.0633) 
[-10.7241] 
0.2979 
(0.0567) 
[5.2491] 
   
 The policy reforms as discussed in section 2 lead to an increase in the number of 
wholesale market participants, along with new products and increasing volumes of 
exchange electricity trading coupled with the re-design of network regulation, which 
seem to have facilitated the overall wholesale market integration process in 
Germany.  
 However, the convergence co-efficient shown in Figure 2 incorporates the 
carbon price in assessing the degree of wholesale market integration. A recent study 
by Zachmann and Hirschhausen (2008) has shown that rising prices of emission 
allowances have a stronger impact on electricity prices than falling prices, identifying 
strategic asymmetric cost pass-through. Hence we find it necessary to assess the 
degree of market integration in the absence of carbon prices to gauge the 
importance of allowance prices concerning wholesale market integration. Therefore 
we re-estimate our state space model with EEX and OTC electricity prices net of 
emission costs. The net prices indicate the net revenue that a generator could earn 
having bought the gas and required number of carbon allowances. This is calculated 
as Net prices = Price of Electricity - [(Price of CO2) * (Gas Emissions Intensity)] 
where the gas emissions intensity factor is considered to be 0.411 tCO2/MWh.  
 
Figure 3:  
Time Varying Path of the convergence coefficient (β2) for net prices 
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 Figure 3 displays the results obtained for the net wholesale prices of electricity 
for EEX and OTC. The final state co-efficient being 0.99 confirms the result of the 
previous estimation confirming the development path established to our first model. 
Nonetheless, the current state of market integration from our results suggests that 
the arbitrage opportunities across the two markets have exhausted over time with 
strong price convergence. However the results should not be interpreted as if the 
wholesale spot markets are entirely efficient yet, as market integration is an on-going 
process.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 In 2002, the European Energy Exchange (EEX) started operations, changing 
electricity spot trading in Germany fundamentally. Since then, the previously 
dominant form of trading OTC is declining. The aim of this paper was to study the 
price development and convergence of the EEX and OTC day-ahead spot markets 
in relation to new market developments and structural changes over time. Therefore 
we applied a linear state space model based on a Kalman filter approach. This 
procedure allowed us to comment on the degree of market integration between the 
markets via an analysis of price convergence. Our results suggest an integrated 
wholesale spot market of electricity in Germany. The operation of EEX at Leipzig 
starting 2002 followed by extensive wholesale market reforms indeed contributed to 
the wholesale spot markets integration in Germany. These results also hold when 
the prices are corrected for the emissions prices. Applying a Vector Error 
Correction Model confirmed the importance of the EEX as a driver of price 
adjustments at the OTC spot market. 
 While market integration is a result of increasing market competition, our results 
however should not be interpreted as the wholesale markets being perfectly 
competitive yet. Further research is recommended to diagnose the exact competitive 
nature of the wholesale spot markets in Germany. Although we believe the results 
will not change significantly, alternative OTC hourly spot price data may provide 
additional insights in understanding the whole market integration process especially 
in the price adjustment process. Also the effect of the EEX spot market having 
merged with the French Powernext might be an interesting field for future analysis.   
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